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In this paper I shall argue that the freedom of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered
persons would be enhanced if sexual orientation were treated as a core constituent of
personal identity in a manner similar to religious belief. First, I shall briefly sketch David
A. J. Richards’s development of this thought. Second, I shall argue, contra Andrew
Murphy, that controversy concerning sexual orientation manifests the characteristics of
conscience politics. Third, I shall explain why belief is a better fit than ascription or
immutability as a basis for public policy in this area. Moreover, conscience politics may
require not only noninterference but also positive public support. I conclude that the
inclusion of same-sex couples in the institution of civil marriage is analagous to support
for the free exercise of conscientious belief.
Richards’s analogy between sexuality and religion
For Richards, neither the immutability or salience of particular traits, nor the political
powerlessness of groups characterized by such traits, most properly triggers strict
scrutiny of distinctions based upon them. The true evil of discrimination grounded in
race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation, rather, is the cultural dehumanization of the
individual that he terms moral slavery. “This structural injustice is marked by two
features: first, abridgment of basic human rights in a group of persons, and second, the
unjust rationalization of such abridgment on the inadequate grounds of dehumanizing
stereotypes that reflect a history and culture of such abridgment” (Richards 1999, 53; see
also 3-4, 17-18, 22, 50, 55, 84, 86, and Richards 2005, 39-40, 105-106). That is, the
dominant culture devalues some human beings as bearers of rights, and then justifies this
devaluation on the basis of history and experience that themselves bear the marks of this
original dehumanization. These individuals thus lose the ability to define their own
identities because they are culturally constructed by the dominant culture, a form of
intolerance that Richards describes as a violation of “the inalienable right to conscience,
which I identify as the free exercise of the moral powers of rationality and reasonableness
in terms of which persons define personal and ethical meaning in living” (Richards 1999,
18). The fundamental right to an intimate life, like the right to conscience, “protects
intimately personal moral resources . . . and the way of life that expresses and sustains
them in facing and meeting rationally and reasonably the challenge of a life worth living”
(74).
Although moral slavery did not consign individuals to a servile social status, it
traditionally exiled individuals from any conception of a moral community by the
unspeakability of the sexual expression by which they were defined. This silencing
“rendered homosexuality into a kind of cultural death, naturally thus understood and
indeed condemned as a kind of ultimate heresy or treason against essential moral values”
(Richards 1999, 90). The aim of Colorado Amendment 2, banning antidiscrimination
laws protecting sexual orientation and overturned in Romer v. Evans (517 U.S. 620,
1996), “was decisively that advocates of gay and lesbian identity should be compelled to

abandon their claims to personal and ethical legitimacy and either convert to the true
view or return to the silence of their traditional unspeakability” (Richards 1999, 92; see
also 70, 90, 126-127, and Richards 2005, 107-108). Opposition to identity claims as a
form of conscience suggests that this identity “is as unworthy of respect as a traditionally
despised religion like Judaism; the practice of that form of heresy may thus be abridged,
and certainly persons may be encouraged to convert from its demands or, at least, be
supinely and ashamedly silent” (Richards 1999, 93; see also Richards 2005, 108-109).
Like conventional assertions of religious orthodoxy, suggests Richards, this opposition is
unrelated to the immutability or saliency of dissenting views and is itself a sectarian form
of moral orthodoxy (Richards 1999, 91-93; see also Richards 2005, 118-119).
In essence, Richards is arguing that the experience of same-sex attraction is a core
feature of one’s personal identity, just as religious allegiance may be for believers. The
living out of these features propels one to engage in particular practices. Denial of the
ability to do so openly, or in some cases even to admit such an allegiance, amounts to a
denial of values that are central to one’s ethical identity. For Richards, in the American
constitutional tradition “the right to intimate life is as much a basic human right as the
right of conscience; conscience is so personally engaged with the issues of intimate
sexual life because both involve the resources of thought, conviction, feeling, and
emotion at the heart of the ultimate concerns of moral personality” (Richards 2005, 110;
see also 79, 103-104).
Although rights of conscience may be abridged under some circumstances, Richards
suggests that such abridgment must be “justified on compelling secular grounds of
protecting public goods reasonably acknowledged as such by all persons” (Richards
1999, 18), or “a compelling public reason, not on grounds of reasons that are today
sectarian (internal to a moral tradition not based on reasons available and accessible to
all)” (78; see also 50, 86, 97, and Richards 2005, 135-136). He does not believe that such
grounds exist. Because those who would regulate sexual expression for their own moral
reasons differ on the proper scope of the political community, a paternalistic approach
could potentially justify intervention in people’s sexual and religious lives, notes David
Erdos, insofar as as the state might determine that their sexual and religious practices
were grounded on false reasoning or reflected false beliefs. “State attempts to extinguish
a person’s right to an intimate sexual life rest, not on a judgment about the morality of
such a sexual life, buit rather on a perfectionist understanding of the state which in its
logic undermines not only sexual freedom but also other freedoms including religious
freedom” (Erdos 2005, 22; see 19-23).
Conscience and identity
The equation of sexual orientation and its expression with religious allegiance and its
practice does not, however, lack controversy. On Andrew Murphy’s view, Richards’s
“expansive view of toleration and conscience” equates conscience with personal
autonomy, and therefore requires a much broader conception of the private sphere than
did traditional interpretations of toleration. Theological individualism “has no necessary
connection with religious toleration because it does not rule out a strong sense of

communal authority in a whole host of other spheres” (Murphy 2001, 29; see also 33-37,
41, 43). For early tolerationists, “disputes fall within either the sphere of conscience or
the civil sphere, and issues having a deleterious effecton civil peace leave the realm of
conscience in their very essence” (52). Tolerationists simply desired the negative liberty
of noncoercion and state neutrality. They praised autonomy “only in contexts in which it
enabled one to act in religiously responsible ways to secure the ultimate good of personal
salvation” (240), or in which it created “a public space in which individuals and groups of
differing persuasions could live out their own conceptions of religious truth and the
demands it placed on human life” (242). Conscience was not subject to coercion, because
it was interpreted as “a faculty of the understanding and not of the will” (Murphy 2001,
228; see also 112). Liberty of conscience, as Murphy explains, thus became grounded in
religious voluntarism, or the conviction that one should not only worship correctly but
also do so voluntarily. Moreover, “Voluntarism is not the same thing, strictly speaking, as
choice: in other words, tolerationists did not claim that one chose one’s beliefs, but rather
that the understanding was persuaded, inexorably so, of the truth of a given faith” (229;
see also 254).
Murphy’s conscience paradigm includes both the extension of the notion of
conscience to nonreligious standards of morality, as in conscientious objection to military
service, and also its increasingly subjective character. “Conscience remains a term
denoting the belief structures (whatever their source or foundation) by which individuals
decide upon and judge their actions” (278). Despite changes, “conscience-based politics
boils down to the claim that states must recognize individuals’ beliefs and values about
truth and the good . . . as sacrosanct. . . . Within the parameters of civil peace and social
order, governments must grant liberty to act on those values, as a necessary corollary to
the free workings of the human mind” (279). In my view, this conception of conscience is
broad enough to encompass not only religious convictions, but also other core facets of
moral personality such as culture and sexuality.
Murphy argues, however, that contemporary issues concerning race, gender, and
sexual oreintation belong under the rubric of identity politics rather than liberty of
conscience. Where the conscience paradigm requires equal treatment before the law and
the removal of barriers implicit in the concept of negative liberty, identity politcs “instead
argues for a positive commitment to equal respect between social groups and even the
affirmation and celebration of difference per se” (281). The concerns for authenticity and
respect that characterize identity politics, often grounded on ascribed characteristics, do
not, Murphy suggests, fit well into a conscience paradigm based on freedom to believe
(282). The conscience paradigm valorizes neither neutrality nor the pursuit of selfrespect, “but instead the promotion of a pacific public space in which citizens can live out
their deepest beliefs” (287).
Murphy admits, however, that because beliefs about ultimate truth, religious or not,
are foundational in one’s sense of self, “conscience contains within it at least a latent
notion of identity” (281), although the two concepts for him imply distinct sociopolitical
agendas. Regarding sexuality, Murphy writes in 2001 that the reversal of the Supreme
Court’s 1986 decision to uphold Georgia’s criminalization of sodomy (Bowers v.

Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 1986) would represent a minimal baseline of toleration from
which further discussion about the requirements of liberal citizenship might proceed
(288). This reversal has now occurred (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 2003).
Therefore, I shall extend this discussion by maintaining that the desire of same-sex
couples to participate in the institution of marriage comprises both the search for
toleration rooted in conscience politics and the search for recognition and equal respect
that Murphy associates with identity politics.
First, I believe that Richards and Murphy are both correct to deemphasize the
importance of ascribed characteristics regarding sexuality and religion respectively.
Although African Americans and women can sometimes pass as whites or as men, we
know that they have been objects of discrimination because of, rather than despite, their
ascribed identities. Therefore, arguing for respect for same-sex relationships or for samesex couples’ desire to marry on the basis of ascribed characteristics beyond individual
control is not particularly helpful. Moreover, the defense of identity on grounds of
immutability implies an apology, Kenji Yoshino observes. If, as Richards argues, samesex attraction has been regarded as akin to a despised religion from which adherents
should convert or else about which they should keep silent, the immutability defense
“resists the conversion demand by saying ‘I cannot change,’ rather than by saying ‘I will
not change.’ It suggests electroshock treatment for homosexuals is wrong because it does
not work. But such treatment would be no less wrong if it did” (Yoshino 2007, 48). The
relationship between ascription and choice, however, is more complex than I have yet
indicated.
As we have seen, Murphy suggests that identity politics’ emphasis on ascribed
characteristics is ill-suited to the conscience paradigm, which is based on religious
voluntarism. Yet he also states that religious voluntarism should not be understood to
denote one’s choice of beliefs, but, rather, one’s understanding that is persuaded that a
particular set of beliefs is true. A fault line exists here that I believe impacts discussions
of both religious belief and sexuality. Sexual orientation is currently understood by most
knowledgeable people as an innate predisposition, a particular type of attraction and a
corresponding disposition to engage in certain kinds of behaviors. Whatever one’s sexual
orientation, however, one may choose either to act upon or not to act upon the attractions
one experiences. Consider individuals who may choose a celibate life. Although celibacy
may be a function of circumstance, it may also result from choice, as in decisions to join
certain religious orders or to foreswear intimate relationships for any number of personal
reasons. But the decision to live a celibate life does not indicate that these individuals
possess no basic sexual orientation; they may simply hold other values in higher regard
than they do the value of intimate relationships, and they choose to uphold these other
values. When individuals do not opt to live celibate lives, on the other hand, their sexual
practices will most likely flow from their basic orientations, whether opposite-sex
attraction, same-sex attraction, or both as in bisexuality. In Murphy’s terms, one’s
understanding is inexorably persuaded of the truth that one type of sexual orientation
rather than another is definitive of one’s selfhood. Choice then need not mean opting
from a menu of ice cream flavors from which one is detached. Instead, choice is the
affirmation of an understanding of which one is inexorably persuaded, whether in the

realm of religion or that of sexuality.
Constitutive choice
The tension that Murphy highlights between choice and understanding resonates with
Michael Sandel’s distinction between the voluntarist self who chooses and the cognitive
or knowing self who understands. For Sandel, because the self is made up of past
reflections and experiences, it cannot experience freedom from constitutive ends and
interests without being disempowered and actually dissolved (Sandel 1982, 57-58, 172,
153). As I have argued elsewhere, however (Gill 2001, 19, 37), this simply means that we
cannot constantly start afresh as we approach life decisions, uninfluenced and
unencumbered by past reflections and experiences. When Sandel’s self heeds the claims
of its constituent attachments, it possesses a reality apart from its apparantly constitutive
ends. Otherwise, its attachments would be fixed, unable to be ranked or ordered. The
voluntarist and cognitive dimensions of human agency, then, are not competitive, but
complementary, necessary both to individual self-definition and the individual exercise of
human moral powers. Moreover, the two dimensions of agency reinforce each other.
Projects and goals endorsed or affirmed by an agent have in some sense been chosen. Yet
once affirmed, they become constitutive of the agent, although potentially subject to
reexamination, and thus become the ground or standpoint from which subsequent choices
are made.
In her identification of conscience with what she terms constitutive choice, Yael
Tamir implicitly draws on this distinction yet complementarity between the choosing and
the knowing self. Cultural or religious membership may initially be chosen, or it may be
affirmed as the result of a particular and persuasive understanding; yet we subsequently
view such membership as imposing particular duties or imperatives on us (Tamir 1993,
39-40; see 35-42). Either way, we would expect our religious practices that have not been
deemed harmful to others to be respected, and perhaps even accommodated. They have
become constitutive of our personhood. It is for this reason, Tamir argues, not because
they are innate or inborn, that religious belief and the practices flowing from it carry
special weight. I am suggesting that sexuality plays a role analgous to religious belief in
the constitution of our personhood.
On Tamir’s interpretation, cultural membership, religious belief, and by extension
sexual oreintation should be accorded protection not because they are ascribed or
unchosen constitutents of identity, but because minority status in living out these central
features of identity is unchosen (Tamir 1993, 37; see also 7-8, 41-42). Accordingly, these
may require protection in the form of positive action by the state to enable individuals to
live in accordance with their choices, that is, with their conscientiously chosen or
affirmed convictions about how they should live their lives. Richards suggests that “The
constitutional protection of religion never turned on its putative immutable and salient
character (people can and do convert, and can and do conceal religious convictions) but
rather on the traditional place of religion in the conscientious reasonable formation of
one’s moral identity in public and private life.” The protection of core features of moral
identity should be directed both against laws that unreasonably burden the free exercise

of one’s conscientious convictions and also against laws that encourage conversion to
some form of sectarian orthodoxy (Richards 2005, 107-108; see 107-109). In fact, for
Richards the First Amendment’s free exercise and antiestablishment clauses are grounded
on different but complementary aspects of equal respect for human moral powers. The
free exercise clause protects current conscientious belief against state coercion
concerning the observance or expression of beliefs already held, while the
antiestablishment clause focuses on “the formation and revision of conscience,”
protecting the forming and changing of such conceptions” (Richards 1986, 140; see also
Richards 2005, 108).
Tamir’s conception of constitutive choice encompasses both of these aspects of
conscientious belief, that of realizing or understanding the nature of one’s ethical identity,
and also that of determining or choosing how that identity should be lived out. To culture
and religion, I would add sexual orientation as constitutive of identity and as therefore in
some contexts worthy of positive protection as a manifestation of conscientious belief. In
arguing for the intrinsic value of religious capabilities, Martha Nussbaum states, “The
liberty of religious belief, membership, and activity is among the central human
capabilities. To be able to search for an understanding of the ultimate meaning of life in
one’s own way is among the most important aspects of a life that is truly human.”
Because this search frequently involves religious belief and practice, “to burden these
practices is thus to inhibit many people’s search for the ultimate good” (Nussbaum 2000,
342). As we have seen, Richards overtly equates intimate life and conscience when he
suggests that the right to both protects “personal moral resources . . . and the way of life
that expresses and sustains them in facing and meeting . . . the challenge of a life worth
living” (Richards 1999, 74). Finally, Murphy states that in conscience-based politics,
individuals’ beliefs about truth and the good should be regarded as “sacrosanct,” and that
within the boundaries of the social order government should allow us the liberty to act on
these values (Murphy 2001, 279). Because sexual expression also may implicate personal
beliefs about truth and the good, it may also fit under the rubric of conscience-based
politics.
Just as some individuals wish to bear witness to their religious beliefs by engaging in
the practices that flow from them, some same-sex couples wish to bear witness to their
personal commitments by marrying on the same terms as opposite-sex couples. As
voluntary organizations, religious groups may decide for themselves which unions to
celebrate. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, does not preside at the marriages of
divorced persons unless they have first secured church-approved annulments. By
depriving same-sex couples of the ability to participate in the civil institution of marriage
where opposite-sex couples may do so, however, I believe that the state is conferring on
them a mark of second-class citizenship and abridging the free exercise of the dictates of
conscience. Moreover, excluding same-sex couples from marriage is a mark of secondclass citizenship in part because of the abridgment of free exercise of the dictates of
conscience. Civil marriage is a public institution, and as such it is sanctioned and
encouraged by the state. As described by Amy Gutmann, “Discriminatory exclusion is
harmful when it publicly expresses the civic inequality of the excluded even in the
absence of any other showing that it causes the civic inequality in question” (Gutmann

2008, 97).
If freedom of conscience means freedom in belief and practice, it also implies freedom
to be open about what one’s beliefs and practices are. As put by Yoshino, “So long as
there is a right to be a particular kind of person, I believe it logically and morally follows
that there is a right to say what one is” (Yoshino 2007, 70). Skeptics about marriage view
same-sex marriage as a kind of assimilation, because it makes same-sex couples more
like straight couples. For Yoshino, however, advocating for or participating in same-sex
marriage can be a type of flaunting, an assertion that same-sex couples can publicly claim
the same rights and entitlements as traditional couples (91; see also 18). Support of or
participation in same-sex marriage is therefore a protest against the civic inequality that
exclusion represents. In my view, civil marriage is for same-sex couples the ultimate act
of “saying what one is.” When the state is complicit in this act by sanctioning the
marriage of same-sex couples, moreover, it confers the “Good Housekeeping seal of
approval” that defines civic equality.
In this context, civil marriage is an instance of the practice of what Ingrid Creppell
terms “public privacy.” When Locke became convinced that the implementation of
religious toleration would mitigate the dangers of religious identification, he suggested
that the public presentation of one’s private beliefs before the larger community would
legitimate the individuation of religious belief. It would protect public presentation or
open worship from interference, and it would create a buffer zone between the purely
private and purely public that would combine communal expression and recognition with
distance and protection (Creppell 1996, 227-229). Similarly, the participation of samesex couples in the civil institution of marriage is, as for straight couples, a public
presentation of identity, belief, and commitment. Marriage creates a buffer zone that
shields couples from interference in their private relationships, but it does so through the
puiblic affirmation of commitment in the eyes of the community. Public recognition is a
precondition for the protection of the private aspects of religious belief and practice, as
well as sexual orientation and practice.
If, as I have argued, the deployment of one’s sexuality may be considered a matter of
adhering to one’s conscientious beliefs, how much more so is the personal decision to
undertake the ideally lifelong commitment of matrimony? Typically, one’s understanding
is persuaded, “inexorably so” in Murphy’s terms, of the truth that only life with another
particular person will fulfill life’s ultimate meaning, will sustain one in the challenges or
a worthwhile life, and will allow one to live out one’s values about truth and the good.
For same-sex couples, whether conventionally religiously inclined or not, the desire to
participate in marriage as a civil institution may be a desire for the free exercise of their
religious or broader conscientious beliefs. In typical conscience-based politics, dissenters
wish to practice religious beliefs that are different from those enshrined in and endorsed
by the dominant consensus. Here, however, the dissenters wish to practice their beliefs in
exactly the same way that the majority does. If, in Murphy’s terms, the conscience
paradigm promotes “a pacific public space in which citizens can life out their deepest
beliefs” (Murphy 2001, 287), the quest for same-sex marriage in my view qualifies as
conscience-based politics. Moreover, it is a type of conscience-based politics the aims of

which require not only freedom from interference, but also positive action through the
admission of same-sex couples to civil marriage.
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